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Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's General Duty Clause 
and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard 
David J. Kolesar 
The prevalence of repetitive tasks in the modem workplace is the 
natural consequence of advanced industrial technology. 1 Increasing 
specialization in the production process requires that each worker per-
form an ever-decreasing range of tasks more and more often. For ex-
ample, a worker in a poultry processing plant may make 14,120 cuts to 
debone as many as 3780 turkeys during one shift.2 A typist may strike 
more than 10,000 keystrokes per hour.3 A packer at a tea factory may 
perform the same hand movements 12,000 times in one shift.4 Each 
motion involved may seem innocuous in itself, but one can imagine 
that the staggering number of repetitions eventually might cause phys-
ical injury. Although the full extent of damage caused by repetitive 
motions is uncertain, 5 rapidly growing public awareness has made cu-
mulative trauma disorders (CTDs) "the No. 1 occupational hazard of 
the 1990's."6 
The term CTDs designates a diverse assortment of disorders that 
can affect both the musculoskeletal system and the peripheral nervous 
system. 7 CTDs most often affect the soft tissues of the hands, wrists, 
1. See Willis J. Goldsmith, Cu"ent Developments in Safety and Health: Workplace Ergo-
nomics: A Safety and Health Issue for the '90s, IS EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 291, 293 (1989) (noting 
that assembly lines distribute production tasks and that each employee repeatedly performs a 
small set of tasks); Maria Mallory & Hazel Bradford, An Invisible Workplace Hazard Gets 
Harder to Ignore, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 92 (stating that advanced technology divides jobs 
into much smaller tasks than even a normal assembly line does). 
2. Thomas J. Armstrong et al., Ergonomics Considerations in Hand and Wrist Tendinitis, 12 
J. HAND SURGERY 830, 833 (1987). 
3. Mallory & Bradford, supra note 1, at 92. 
4. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 833. 
S. Whether or not repetition alone can cause injury is still a matter of debate. While some 
studies, e.g., Barbara A. Silverstein et al., Occupational Factors and Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, 11 
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 343, 353 (1987), as well as intuition, see In re Establishment Inspection of 
Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1154 (7th Cir. 1990), suggest that repetition of certain 
motions can cause bodily injury, some musculoskeletal-injury experts insist that there is no evi-
dence that repetition causes physical damage or injury. E.g., Nortin M. Hadler, Illness in the 
Workplace.· The Challenge of Musculoskeletal Symptoms, 10 J. HAND SURGERY 451, 454 (1985). 
6. Dramatic Rise in Repetitive Motion Injuries and OSHA '.I' Response: Hearing Before the 
Employment and Housing Subcomm. of House Comm. on Government Operations, IOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter House Hearing] (opening statement of Tom Lantos, Chairman). 
7. Barbara A. Silverstein et al., Hand-Wrist Disorders Among Investment Casting Plant 
Workers, 12 J. HAND SURGERY 838, 838 (1987). For example, some commonly reported CTDs 
include carpal tunnel syndrome, tendinitis, tenosynovitis, low back pain, DeQuervain's Disease, 
Raynaud's syndrome, and trigger-finger. See, e.g., House Panel Hears Testimony on Cumulative 
Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,112 (June 
6, 1989). 
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arms, neck, or back.8 All CTDs develop gradually over time,9 but the 
particular symptoms and effects vary with the type of CTD. 10 CTD 
sufferers almost always experience pain and often suffer impairment of 
sensory, autonomic, and motor functions. 11 CTDs sometimes require 
surgery12 and occasionally develop into permanent disabilities. 13 
A debate about the relative causal contributions of occupational 
and nonoccupational factors to the development of CTDs currently 
divides the medical community.14 Experts face the difficult task of 
isolating a specific factor from a variety of possible causes, each of 
which probably has some influence on the occurrence of CTDs.15 
8. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 292. 
9. See id. at 291. 
10. Symptoms of tendinitis, for example, include lingering pain radiating up the forearm and 
swelling of the affected area. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831-32. Symptoms of carpal 
tunnel syndrome include recurring or persistent pain, numbness, and tingling in the hand and 
wrist, loss of the ability to grasp objects, and loss of strength and dexterity. Victoria R. Masear 
et al., An Industrial Cause of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, I IA J. HAND SURGERY 222, 222 (1986); 
Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 347. 
11. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 292. The impairment of these three functions frequently 
occurs in carpal tunnel syndrome, the most well-known and commonly cited CTD. See Arm-
strong et al., supra note 2, at 830. 
12. See. e.g., William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safely and 
Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence 
Employer Decisions To Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1989). For 
an opinion on the propriety of surgery as a readily available option for sufferers of CTDs, see 
Nortin M. Hadler, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: An Iatrogenic Concept, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL 
MED. 38, 40 (1990) (finding that there is no reliable basis on which to justify surgery in most 
cases and that workers should be left to their natural coping mechanisms); see also Dean S. 
Louis, Cumulative Trauma Disorders. 12 J. HAND SURGERY 823, 825 (1987) ("Nonsurgical 
problems, such as many of the cumulative trauma disorders that we [hand surgeons] see, require 
restraint .••• "). 
13. While disabilities have been reported, such extreme cases have been rare. For example, 
Armstrong cites a study of an electronics firm spanning six years in which only two CTD cases 
were classified as disabilities. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831; see infra section II.D (ana-
lyzing the seriousness of harm caused by CTDs). 
14. "It is almost always possible to find cases to argue for one factor or set of factors over 
another." Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831; compare Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 356 
(concluding that repetitiveness and forcefulness contribute strongly to the incidence of CTDs and 
that this finding cannot be explained by nonoccupational factors) with Hadler, supra note 12, at 
39 (finding that CTDs in the workplace are caused by many factors and that "[occupational] 
usage is only one factor and not overwhelming, at that"); see infra section II.D (analyzing the 
controversy concerning the causation of CTDs). 
15. Suspected causes of CTDs include repetitive motions, forceful exertions, awkward pos-
tures, and vibrations, as well as congenital defects, chronic diseases, aging, gender, and recrea-
tional usages. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831. The diversity of CTD symptoms and their 
long latency period make attributing causation to specific factors even more difficult. Due to 
their cumulative nature, CTDs necessarily require long periods of time to manifest themselves in 
recognizable symptoms. In fact, many of those affected by CTDs at least initially attribute their 
discomfort to such factors as aging. See, e.g., House Panel Hears Testimony on Cumulative 
Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,112 (June 
6, 1989) (attributing the increase in CTDs to the aging workforce among other factors). Addi-
tionally, the latency period also increases the likelihood that a worker will not be engaged in the 
particular occupation alleged to have caused the CTD at the time the symptoms strike, because 
of either a job change or a variety of other reasons. For example, one symptom of carpal tunnel 
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While medical science has known for more than two centuries that 
certain motions may injure the body, 16 only recently has attention fo-
cused on the possibility that the nature of one's work causes CTDs.17 
The heightened concern about the relationship betw~en CTDs and 
occupations stems from a dramatic increase in the number of reported 
CTDs at the workplace in recent years. The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) estimates that more than 
five million workers suffered from motion injuries in 1986, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) projects that 
by the year 2000, half of all workers' compensation claims will be re-
lated to CTDs.18 A 1980 study found that sixteen million workdays 
per year were lost due to CTDs.19 The figures continue to grow. 
From 1987 to 1988, the number of reported CTDs increased by fifty-
eight percent. 20 This dramatic rise has prompted greater interest in 
ergonomics, the study of workstation and tool design to prevent work-
ers' injuries.21 While the theory behind ergonomics has won consider-
able popularity, however, ergonomics has not been widely accepted as 
a medical discipline or a full-fledged science, and its tenets have failed 
to convince many experts.22 Nevertheless, ergonomics has highlighted 
syndrome is a sharp pain while sleeping at night. See,.e.g., Masear et al., supra note 10, at 222. 
Night is a time of day least likely to be associated by the worker with his job. 
16. In 1713, Bernardini Ramazzini recognized that workers can be injured by "certain vio-
lent and irregular motions and unnatural postures of the body." BERNARDINI RAMAZZINI, DIS-
EASES OF WORKERS 15 (Wilmer c. Wright trans., 1940) (1713). 
17. Jeffrey G. Huvelle & Michael G. Michaelson, Stiff Wrists at Work Mean Stiff Fines for 
Many U.S. Businesses, LEGAL TIMES Feb. 12, 1990 at 24, 24. The connection between occupa-
tions and CTDs has only recently been posited in part because the number of reported workplace 
CTDs has recently increased dramatically. See infra text accompanying note 23. Why this in-
crease in reported CTDs developed, however, is a point of debate. While some maintain that 
CTDs stem from the use of advanced technology, e.g., Mallory & Bradford, supra note 1, at 92, 
93 (calling CTDs "the first major postindustrial illness"), others assert that the recent increase in 
reported CTDs resulted from workers being told that they have been "injured," see Hadler, supra 
note 12, at 38-40, or from the availability of workers' compensation. John D. Worrall & David 
Appel, The Impact of Workers' Compensation Benefits on Low-Back Claims, in CLINICAL CON-
CEPTS IN REGIONAL MUSCULOSKELETAL ILLNESS 281, 295-96 (Nortin M. Hadler ed., 1987) 
(citing a study and finding that the availability of workers' compensation gives workers an incen-
tive to claim more severe disabilities and to claim more often); Louis, supra note 12, at 825 
(concluding that workers' compensation has a detrimental effect on workers by inducing them to 
claim an injury and adopt disability status). Still others maintain that the recent increase in the 
number of reported CTDs is a consequence of a change in the law concerning employer record-
keeping. See, e.g., Dan Malovany, Pepperidge, Chicago Law Firm Challenge OSHA, BAKERY 
PRODS. & MKTG., Oct. 24, 1990, at 30. 
18. Mallory & Bradford, supra note 1, at 92. 
19. Louis, supra note 12, at 823. Not surprisingly, the economic effect is also considerable. 
The American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons estimated that, in 1984, CTDs caused $27 bil-
lion per year in lost earnings and medical expenses. See House Hearing, supra note 6, at 2. 
20. Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24 (citing the Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
21. See id. (stating that ergonomics tries to improve the "machine-person interface"). 
22. See id. For a critical account, see Hadler, supra note 12, at 39; Malovany, supra note 17, 
at 30. 
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the potential scope of the CTD problem.23 
Complex medical issues surrounding CTDs in the workplace cre-
ate special problems in evaluating the legal significance of CTDs. 
OSHA, the agency charged with protecting workers,24 currently pros-
ecutes employers for failing to eliminate CTDs from the workplace 
under the assumption that such a failure violates the "general duty" 
clause25 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act).26 An 
employer's "general duty" is to furnish a place of employment "free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death 
or serious physical harm .... "27 To enforce the employer's duty, 
OSHA issues citations and imposes large fines for exposing employees 
to CTDs.28 Many employers choose to settle with OSHA rather than 
challenge these citations in court as an improper application of the 
general duty clause.29 As a result, no court has yet decided the issue 
whether OSHA has properly interpreted the general duty clause to 
apply to CTDs under a so-called ergonomics violation. 30 
OSHA's handling of CTDs must be reevaluated. The general duty 
clause affords OSHA a convenient means to respond to the popular 
concern about CTDs without engaging in the more time-consuming 
process of promulgating a permanent standard. The promulgation 
process, however, has merits that OSHA should not expediently over-
look. Initiated and controlled by the Secretary of Labor, the process 
provides for extensive research and investigation and assures that in-
terested parties have the opportunity to supply evidence and voice 
their concerns.31 OSHA's current use of the general duty clause to 
23. Cf. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831 ("Although morbidity studies .•• indicate a 
problem of epidemic proportions, the magnitude is probably underestimated."). 
24. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988) provides: "Each employer ... shall furnish to each of his 
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that 
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees •••• " 
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988); see Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides for Red Meat Industry, 
Promises General Regulations Across All Industries, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-7 
(Aug. 31, 1990) [hereinafter Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides] (noting that the general duty clause 
will continue to be used to prosecute employers for exposing workers to CTDs). 
27. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988). 
28. For example, in 1988, OSHA levied a $3.1 million fine against IBP, Inc., the nation's 
largest meatpacker, for exposing 20% of its workers to CTDs. Maakestad & Helm, supra note 
12, at 11. Five months later, OSHA fined John Morrell & Co., another prominent meatpacker, 
$4.3 million for similar CTD-related reasons. Id. at 10 (concerning hand and arm disorders). 
29. See Roger L. Freeman, OSHA: Standards Are Largely Undefined for Repetitive-Motion 
Injuries, NATL. L.J., July 29, 1991, at 28, 28. 
30. Ergonomics violation refers to a violation of the general duty clause in which the "haz-
ard" is the exposure of employees to CTDs. See, e.g., id. The term assumes that such exposure is 
a violation of the clause. As of June 16, 1992, Secretary of Labor v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 
OSHRC No. 89-265, in which Pepperidge Farm contests an OSHA citation for ergonomics viola-
tions, was before an administrative law judge. 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(3) (1988). The promulgation process is the Act's primary enforce-
ment mechanism. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text. 
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prosecute employers for alleged ergonomics violations, by contrast, is 
a haphazard attempt to deal with the effects of a complex problem. It 
also violates the intended role of the general duty clause. Given the 
controversial nature of CTDs, the appropriate remedy - and its con-
sequences - should be carefully considered. The decision whether to 
enforce the Act through the clause or through a standard should be 
resolved in favor of the fairest and most effective means of protecting 
the potential victims of CTDs. 32 Use of the general duty clause to 
minimize CTDs fails to meet these criteria. 
This Note argues that neither the Act nor its underlying policies 
supports OSHA's current use of the general duty clause to prosecute 
alleged ergonomics violations and that the only way to protect work-
ers from CTDs fairly and effectively is through the promulgation of an 
ergonomics standard. Part I examines the purposes of the Act, as well 
as the function of the Act's general duty clause. Part II analyzes the 
four requirements of the general duty clause in the context of CTDs 
and finds that the clause does not apply to CTDs. Part III argues that 
the Act's intended policies support the promulgation of an ergonomics 
standard rather than the use of the general duty clause. This Note 
concludes that the Secretary of Labor should promulgate an ergo-
nomics standard33 as soon as possible and that, until then, the general 
duty clause should not be used to prosecute employers for alleged 
ergonomics violations. 
I. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT AND THE 
GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE 
This Part explores the function of the general duty clause as a con-
stituent part of the Act. Section I.A reviews the Act's purposes and 
explains that the promulgation of standards is OSHA's primary en-
forcement mechanism. Section I.B demonstrates that the general duty 
clause plays a secondary role in enforcement and should be invoked 
only in certain circumstances. Section I.C examines the use of the 
general duty clause to penalize employers for CTD occurrences and 
the limited legal authority for dealing with the CTD problem in such a 
manner. Part I concludes that OSHA's practice of applying the gen-
eral duty clause to CTDs deserves critical scrutiny. 
32. Congress recognized the need for the Act to have the respect and confidence of both 
workers and employers: "The Jaw we pass today must be strong, effective, workable, and fair 
• . . . It must guarantee to each American worker a mechanism for developing and enforcing safe 
and healthful working conditions; and it must guarantee to each employer objectivity, fairness, 
and due process." 116 CONG. REc. 38,370 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger). 
33. This Note does not argue for the content of any particular ergonomics standard. That 
will necessarily be left for resolution through the promulgation process. Moreover, reference to 
"an ergonomics standard" is intended to encompass the possibility of multiple ergonomics stan-
dards. In all likelihood, multiple standards will be appropriate and necessary due to the perva-
siveness of CTDs. For example, "specific" promulgated standards might be tailored to various 
high-risk operations or equipment. See infra note 191 and text accompanying notes 190-91. 
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A. TheAct 
In the four years prior to the 1970 passage of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, more Americans were killed in industrial acci-
dents (over 14,500 per year) than in the Vietnam War.34 By one con-
servative estimate, more than 2.2 million workers were disabled on the 
job each year. 35 Such statistics, the "unfortunate by-product of our 
industrial progress,"36 revealed the inadequacy of leaving to the states 
and private industry the responsibility of providing a safe and health-
ful workplace.37 In 1970, Congress declared the need for immediate 
action and passed the Act to deal with this grim situation.38 
The Act, representing the first comprehensive attempt at federal 
regulation of workplace safety and health, 39 seeks "to assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and health-
ful working conditions .... "40 Because it is based on Congress' power 
to regulate interstate commerce,41 the Act reaches virtually all work-
places. 42 As a result, the Act has the broadest possible scope for re-
ducing the number and severity of work-related injuries.43 
Responsibility for enforcing the Act rests with OSHA, the federal 
regulatory agency established by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 
the Act. 44 If, after inspection of a workplace, OSHA believes that a 
violation of the Act has occurred, the Act requires OSHA to issue a 
citation to the employer45 and authorizes the assessment of a pen-
34. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5178. 
35. Id. (stating that this figure is "the lowest count"). 
36. Marjorie E. Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 
3 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 249 (1972). 
37. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5218 (individual views of Sen. Javits). 
38. "The knowledge that the industrial accident situation is deteriorating, rather than im-
proving, underscores the need for action now." Id. at 5178. In addition to the cost in terms of 
human lives, Congress found that work-related injuries and illnesses imposed a substantial bur-
den on interstate commerce in the form of lost production, lost wages, medical expenses, and 
disability compensation payments. 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1988). 
39. Richard S. Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, 86 HARV. L. REv. 988, 988 (1973). 
40. 29 u.s.c. § 651(b) (1988). 
41. 29 u.s.c. § 651(b) (1988). 
42. Gross, supra note 36, at 252 (noting that the Act's broad scope covers "virtually every 
man and woman who is employed in the United States"); see also 116 CONG. REC. 38,371 (1970) 
(statement of Rep. Steiger) (noting that the Act "deals with every conceivable type of industry 
and business .... "). 
43. The breadth of the Act is consistent with Congress' finding that hazards of modem in-
dustry "are not the problem of a single employer, a single industry, nor a single state jurisdiction. 
The spread of industry and the mobility of the workforce combine to make the health and safety 
of the worker truly a national concern." S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted 
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5180. 
44. Secretary of Labor's Order 12-71, 36 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971). 
45. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1988). 
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alty.46 If the employer wishes to contest the citation and penalty, the 
Act entitles it to a hearing before the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission (OSHRC), an independent adjudicatory agency 
whose sole function is to hear challenges to OSHA enforcement 
actions.47 
The Act provides OSHA with two broad means of enforcement: 
the promulgation of safety and health standards and, where no stan-
dard applies, the general duty clause. 48 Congress intended promul-
gated standards to be OSHA's primary means of enforcement; where a 
standard applies, it always takes precedence over the general duty 
clause. 49 Any other outcome would be "inconsistent with the overall 
purpose of the Act" and would render the promulgation provisions 
ineffectual. so Standards are to represent achievable requirements 
based on research, past experience, and the latest scientific evidence 
and should assure, as far as possible, that no employee suffers impaired 
health from exposure to the hazard involved.s1 
Promulgated standards are OSHA's primary means of enforce-
ment because they most effectively carry out the Act's purposes. sz 
Congress passed the Act in part to achieve uniform national safety and 
health conditions. s3 Promulgated standards most effectively accom-
plish this objective by providing guidance to employers. s4 Standards 
also assure that workplace safety and health is achieved through a 
"fair and effective" mechanism.ss Congress was concerned that em-
46. 29 u.s.c. §§ 659, 666 (1988). 
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 661 (1988). Aggrieved parties may then appeal the OSHRC's order 
to the relevant circuit court. 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1988). If the employer fails timely to notify the 
Secretary of its intent to contest an OSHA enforcement action, the citation and penalty are 
deemed final orders of the OSHRC, not subject to review by any court or agency. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 659(a) (1988). 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1988); e.g., Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 
35,971 (July 23, 1986). 
49. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27, 
1973). The natural corollary is that a citation for a violation of the general duty clause is invalid 
where a duly promulgated standard applies. See also 116 CoNG. REc. 42,206 (1970) (statement 
of Rep. Steiger) (stating that primary reliance will be placed on standards). But see UAW v. 
General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir.) (suggesting that the general 
duty clause may play a role, even when a standard applies, if the employer has knowledge of the 
standard's inadequacy), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); infra note 66. 
50. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27, 
1973). 
51. S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5183-84. 
52. See infra Part III. 
53. See S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), repnizted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5177; infra section 111.A.2 (discussing the Act's policy of consistency). 
54. See 116 CONG. REC. 42,206 (1970). "[O]ne of the primary purposes in enacting this 
legislation stems from the need to provide employers with health standards so that they might 
better protect the health and safety of the worker by providing the necessary machinery and 
protective devices in the workplace." Id. 
55. Id. (statement of Rep. Steiger) 
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ployers be subject only to enforcement mechanisms that had under-
gone "procedural scrutiny."56 The Act incorporates this safeguard 
into OSHA rulemaking by providing for recommendations, public 
hearings, and opportunities for opposing viewpoints to be heard con-
cerning proposed standards. s1 
As of yet, the Secretary of Labor has not promulgated an ergo-
nomics standard. On August 30, 1990, Secretary Elizabeth Dole an-
nounced a plan to extend recently adopted ergonomics guidelines for 
the red meat industry to all industries; the extension was to be a step 
toward the development of an ergonomics standard for general indus-
try. 58 Ten days later, however, the Secretary canceled the extension of 
the guidelines and postponed the promulgation process until the need 
for an ergonomics standard could be further determined. 59 Secretary 
Dole stated that absent a specific standard, OSHA will continue to 
prosecute employers for alleged ergonomics violations under the gen-
eral duty clause. 60 
The decision to continue prosecution under the general duty clause 
abandons the procedural safeguards of the promulgation process. 
Moreover, it is not in the best interests of workers. To the extent that 
OSHA relies on the clause as a substitute for an ergonomics stan-
dard, 61 it actually harms workers by preventing the promulgation of 
what would be a more effective and fair remedy for CTDs. 62 
B. The Role of the General Duty Clause 
In the Act's enforcement scheme, the general duty clause plays a 
secondary role. In situations covered by a promulgated standard, the 
Act subordinates the general duty clause to the standard. 63 While the 
56. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1910 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5182 (noting the importance of the opportunity for interested persons to express their views); 116 
CoNG. REc. 38,373 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (noting that standards must be scrutinized 
before they are promulgated to verify the legitimacy of their origins and methods). 
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l).(3) (1988). 
58. Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides, supra note 26, at A-7. A general industry standard is one 
applicable to many employers in various industries. SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, 
AMERICAN BAR AssN., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 167 (Stephen A. Bokat et 
al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter BOKAT]. 
59. Meg Fletcher, OSHA Drops Plan To Extend Safety Rules, Bus. INS., Sept. 10, 1990, at 
28. The decision to stop the promulgation process until more information could be gathered did 
not affect the release of the guidelines for the red meat industry. See id. 
60. Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides, supra note 26, at A-7. 
61. The general duty clause was not intended to be a substitute for promulgated standards. 
BOKAT, supra note 58, at 109. 
62. OSHA's continued reliance on the general duty clause implies that the clause is the func-
tional equivalent of an ergonomics standard. This implication makes concerns about the proper 
enforcement mechanism seem irrelevant and therefore diverts attention from the inadequacies of 
the general duty clause as applied to CTDs. See infra text accompanying note 170 (concluding 
that CTDs fail to satisfy the four requirements of the general duty clause). 
63. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,971 (July 23, 1986) 
(noting that the general duty clause can be invoked only where no specific standard applies). 
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general duty clause should fill the interstices that will necessarily exist 
within the network of standards, 64 allowing prosecution under the 
general duty clause where a standard applies would be "inconsistent 
with the overall purpose of the Act, would emasculate all the provi-
sions dealing with the promulgation of standards, and would give a 
wider effect to the Act's general duty clause than was ever intended by 
Congress."65 Absent an employer's knowledge that a promulgated 
standard is an inadequate protection for workers, compliance with a 
standard precludes liability under the general duty clause. 66 
The interstitial coverage of the clause, together with the coverage 
of promulgated standards, does not address all harmful conditions in 
workplaces. 67 Although the general duty clause applies to situations 
not covered by standards, it does not apply to every such situation. 
Decisions by the OSHRC support the argument that there will be 
harmful conditions and injuries to which the general duty clause does 
not apply. For example, in Alabama Power Co., 68 the OSHRC was 
asked to overturn a general duty citation issued against Alabama 
Power Company for failure to take adequate precautions to protect its 
employees from being crushed by an overturning coal truck. 
Although the OSHRC found that the employees were exposed to a 
hazard of being seriously injured or killed by an overturning truck, it 
vacated the citation because the Secretary of Labor failed to establish a 
more effective feasible means by which the Company could have freed 
its workplace of the hazard. 69 
64. Cf. Dravo Corp. v. OSHRC, 613 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The Secretary cannot 
be expected to have anticipated every conceivable hazardous situation in promulgating specific 
standards."). 
65. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 0.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27, 
1973). 
66. See UAW v. General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir.) ("[A]n 
employer may rely on his compliance with a safety standard to absolve him from liability •.• and 
he will be deemed to have met his obligation under the general duty clause .... "), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 976 (1987). Confronted with allegations that General Dynamics knew a freon standard 
to be an inadequate protection for workers, the court held that if an employer knows that a 
standard will not protect its workers, its general duty will not be discharged. 815 F.2d at 1577. 
This twist in the interplay between the general duty clause and promulgated standards arises 
only in this special factual situation, as the court implied. 815 F.2d at 1577 ("Scienter is the 
key."). 
67. To avoid confusion, the term harmful condition is used here instead of the term hazard. 
In general, a harmful condition can be a "hazard" without being a "recognized hazard," a criti-
cal distinction in applying the general duty clause. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. 
Dec. (CCH) 1! 27,517, at 35,670 (Mar. 4, 1986) (finding that while explosions are possible if 
molten metal merely contacts water, the hazard is "recognized" only if the water is entrapped or 
encapsulated by the molten metal); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 
1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that a hazard will not be "recognized" unless it is preventable). 
68. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1f 27,892 (Apr. 17, 1987). 
69. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 36,578, 36,581; see also John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 28,796, at 38,391 (Nov. 1, 1989) (hazard of working in stooped position 
while pulling weeds in a spinach field not covered by general duty clause); U.S. Steel Corp., 1986-
1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 27,517, at 35,675 (Mar. 4, 1986) (hazard of explosion from pouring 
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The general duty clause's language also indicates that the clause 
applies only in a restricted set of circumstances. Contrary to the im-
plications that one might draw from its popular name, the general 
duty clause is not simply an extension of the common law duty of 
reasonable care - the clause imposes a higher duty that applies only 
in special circumstances.70 According to the general duty clause, an 
employer must "furnish to each of his employees employment and a 
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm .... " 71 
Courts and the OSHRC have articulated four requirements contained 
in this language, analyzed in detail in Part II below, that OSHA must 
prove to establish a violation. 72 Congress subordinated the clause to 
promulgated standards and carefully circumscribed its applicability 
for fear that it provided little notice to employers about the require-
ments for ensuring a safe and healthful workplace.73 
C. Legal Authority for Applying the General Duty Clause to CTDs 
Courts have yet to conclude whether the general duty clause ap-
plies to CTDs. The clause does apply in a variety of other situations, 
however. For example, courts have found violations in failing to pro-
tect against oxygen-deficient atmospheres of "dry" manholes; 74 in per-
mitting a freight elevator in a lead smelting plant to operate with the 
doors and gates open; 75 and in failing to protect employees in the steel 
and iron casting industry against heat stress. 76 The large fines im-
posed by OSHA for alleged ergonomics violations have generally 
and transferring molten metal near water and ice accumulations at two of five locations not 
covered by general duty clause). 
70. Although the Senate Report implies that the general duty clause imposes a duty that is at 
least analogous to the common law duty of reasonable care, see S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186; Gross, supra note 36, at 253 (para· 
phrasing the committee's conclusion on the topic), the better-reasoned views on the subject find 
important distinctions between the common law duty and an employer's general duty. The gen· 
eral duty is more focused than the common law duty: four statutory requirements must be satis· 
fied, see generally infra Part II, but the general duty requires a higher degree of care. See 
National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating 
that employers must take more than merely "reasonable" precautions); 116 CoNG. REC. 38,371 
(1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (noting that, while the common law duty is an after-the-fact 
method of assessing fault, the general duty is a before-the-inquiry method of preventing injuries 
and concluding that the general duty's scope should be limited to prevent unjust application). 
But see Morey, supra note 39, at 1004 (noting that tort concepts of the duty of reasonable care 
may be useful to analysis of the general duty clause in some contexts, especially employee 
misconduct). 
71. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988). 
72. E.g., Petron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986). 
73. See Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1] 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27, 
1973). 
74. Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1991). 
75. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981). 
76. Duriron Co. v. OSHRC, 750 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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prompted cited employers to settle before a court could determine the 
clause's applicability to CTDs. 77 
Circuit courts have described the sufficiency of evidence needed in 
a complaint for OSHA to secure an inspection warrant for alleged 
CTD violations.78 For example, in United States v. Establishment In-
spection of Jeep Corp., 19 employees complained that they were exposed 
to unsafe usage of hand tools, that they were forced to use their hands 
to install parts in an unsafe manner, and that, as a result, they ac-
quired carpal tunnel syndrome. The Sixth Circuit found that the com-
plaint presented OSHA with enough evidence to form a reasonable 
belief that a violation of the Act was being committed. 80 
These decisions, however, do not represent a judicial endorsement 
of the applicability of the general duty clause to CTDs. Less evidence 
is needed to show administrative probable cause for an inspection war-
rant than is needed to show a probability of a violation. 81 In addition, 
while the evidence must support a reasonable belief that the Act has 
been violated, OSHA does not have to specify in its warrant applica-
tion which regulation it believes is being violated. 82 The courts, there-
fore, have not provided a definitive statement on the applicability of 
the general duty clause to CTDs. The primary role of the promulga-
tion process in the Act's enforcement scheme suggests that it is the 
preferred method for all appropriate harmful conditions. Any use of 
the general duty clause as a mere expedient to bypass the promulga-
tion process should be viewed with a critical eye. 83 
77. For example, in 1990, Ford Motor Co. agreed to the most extensive ergonomics settle-
ment in OSHA's history, under which it will implement a comprehensive ergonomics program 
affecting 96% of its plants and will also pay a $1.2 million fine stemming from an inspection of 
one of its plants. Ford Motor Company Agrees to Corporate-Wide Ergonomics Program Under 
Settlement with OSHA, [1990 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1f 10,585 
(July 23, 1990) [hereinafter Ford Motor Company Agrees]. For other noteworthy settlements, see 
Freeman, supra note 29, at 29 n.14. 
78. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1988) authorizes OSHA, upon receipt of a complaint from an 
employee, to make a special inspection of a workplace if it determines that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a violation of a standard exists at the site. If the employer refuses permis-
sion to search the site, OSHA must procure an inspection warrant. See Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (holding that the Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it 
purports to authorize inspections without a warrant). To obtain an inspection warrant, OSHA 
need not show probable cause in the criminal sense. 436 U.S. at 320. "Administrative probable 
cause" is sufficient. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 1982). 
79. 836 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1988). 
80. 836 F.2d at 1027; see also In re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 
900 F.2d 1150, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that a complaint describing the employees in-
jured, the time of injury, the number and type of injuries (neck and wrist), and the believed cause 
(working on assembly lines) was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the Act was 
implicated). 
81. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 1982). The Sixth 
Circuit has approved of this finding. See Establishment Inspection of Jeep Corp., 836 F.2d 1026, 
1027 (6th Cir. 1988). 
82. 836 F.2d at 1027. 
83. See, e.g., Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1f 27,643, at 35,972 (July 23, 
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II. CTDs AND THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE 
The general duty clause protects employees working under "spe-
cial circumstances" for which no standard has yet been adopted. 84 
OSHA must satisfy four requirements to prove a general duty viola-
tion under the Act: (1) the employer has failed to "free" its work-
place of a hazard; (2) the hazard is "recognized"; (3) the hazard 
could have been materially reduced or eliminated by a feasible means 
of abatement; and (4) the hazard is "causing or likely to cause death 
or serious physical harm."85 
This Part argues that workplace CTDs fail to satisfy these require-
ments. CTDs, with their special problems of causation, prevention, 
and seriousness, are not the type of injury to which Congress intended 
the general duty clause to apply. The four sections of this Part analyze 
the four requirements in connection with CTDs and find that, because 
of the special medical problems regarding CTDs, application of the 
general duty clause fails the second and third requirements and likely 
fails the fourth requirement as well. This Part concludes that because 
CTDs fail to satisfy the requirements of the general duty clause, 
OSHA should not use the clause in connection with CTDs. 
A. Failure To Render Workplace Free of Hazard 
Under the first prong of the general duty clause, OSHA must 
prove that an employer failed to render its workplace "free" of recog-
nized hazards. 86 Because employers exercise great control over work-
place conditions, their obligation is not met by merely rendering a 
workplace "reasonably free" of a hazard. 87 The obligation, however, 
1986) (criticizing general duty citations because they resembled an attempt to sidestep the proce-
dural requirements of the Act and vacating citations on other grounds). 
84. S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5186; see BoKAT, supra note 58, at 108 (noting that the general duty clause does not render 
employers guarantors of employees' safety and health). The "special circumstances" in which 
the general duty clause is to apply include cases in which no standard is specifically applicable, 
see, e.g., Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27, 
1973); supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text, and in which the situation satisfies the four 
requirements for applicability of the general duty clause. See, e.g., Petron Corp., 1986-1987 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1l 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986); infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
85. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Na-
tional Realty, articulating elements one, two, and four, represents the first attempt by a circuit 
court to interpret the general duty clause. The OSHRC adopted these elements and subsequently 
added the "feasibility" requirement, see, e.g., Petron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 
1! 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986), which National Realty left unstated but implied. See BOKAT, 
supra note 58, at 114. 
86. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988); see Petron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 27,605, 
at 35,871 (June 2, 1986). For a discussion of the meaning of recognized hazards, see infra section 
11.B. 
87. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265-66 & n.34 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). The court in National Realty reached this conclusion despite the language in the Senate 
and House Reports stating that the general duty clause incorporates principles of common law 
and "merely restates that each employer shall furnish this degree of care." S. REP. No. 1282, 
June 1992] Note - Cumulative Trauma Disorders 2091 
does not create strict liability. 88 Rather, the test takes a middle path: 
a hazard exists at a workplace if OSHA demonstrates that employees 
are exposed to a "significant risk" of harm. 89 
The "significant risk" test developed from the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Insti-
tute. 90 In that case, the Court reviewed a newly promulgated 
standard91 regulating occupational exposure to benzene, a carcinogen; 
the new standard replaced a more permissive standard. Noting that 
Congress did not intend the Act to create "risk-free" workplaces, the 
Court concluded that before promulgating any permanent standard, 
"the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of 
employment is unsafe - in the sense that significant risks are present 
and can be eliminated or lessened."92 The Secretary's proof consisted 
of a presumption that because the evidence in the record did not estab-
lish any level of benzene exposure as safe, exposure in any amount 
must be hazardous. 
The Court held that this proof failed to establish that the amount 
by which the allowable benzene level under the old standard exceeded 
that under the new standard posed a significant risk that would justify 
promulgation of a new standard.93 The Court noted, however, that 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186. The court based its 
position on the employer's degree of control over the workplace as well as other language in the 
Reports concerning the standard of care imposed by the general duty. The standard of care was 
not characterized in terms of reasonableness: employers have a " 'duty to bring no adverse ef-
fects to the life and health of their employees.' " 489 F.2d at 1265 n.34 (quoting S. REP. No. 
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186); see supra note 70 
and accompanying text (discussing the problems with interpreting the general duty as one of 
reasonableness). 
88. See, e.g., National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265-66 ("The duty was to be an achievable one."). 
89. Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,643, at 35,973-74 (July 23, 1986); 
Anoplate Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,519, at 35,680 (Mar. 4, 1986) (stating that 
where a standard requires proof of a "hazard" as an element of the violation, OSHA must show a 
significant risk of harm). In Kastalon, the OSHRC vacated a general duty citation against Kas-
talon, Inc. because OSHA failed sufficiently to prove the existence of a hazard within the mean-
ing of the general duty clause. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,979-80. "In order to 
establish the existence of a hazard [within the meaning of the general duty clause], ... [t]he 
Secretary must prove that the [hazard] to which employees are exposed presents a significant risk 
of harm." 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,974. OSHA's evidence that MOCA, a chemical 
used in Kastalon's manufacturing process, induced cancer in laboratory animals was too specula-
tive to prove that exposure to MOCA in any detectable amount posed a significant risk to work-
ers. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,974, 35,979-80. 
90. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
91. Although the Court dealt with the extent of hazardous conditions necessary for the Sec-
retary to promulgate a specific standard, the OSHRC has held that the Court's reasoning applies 
equally to the general duty clause. Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,643, at 
35,974, 35,975 n.7 (July 23, 1986). The Fifth Circuit disagrees. See Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. 
Donovan, 729 F.2d 317, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1984). 
92. 448 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). 
93. 448 U.S. at 659. The Court explicitly declined to express an opinion as to what factual 
determinations would warrant a conclusion that significant risks were present that would justify 
a new standard. 448 U.S. at 659. 
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OSHA is not required to prove significant risk to scientific certainty.94 
When operating on the "frontiers of scientific knowledge," OSHA 
may make conservative assumptions and risk error on the side of over-
protection, provided that it supports its findings with a "body of repu-
table scientific thought."9s 
CTDs, like carcinogens, exist on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge. While the evidence of the risk of harm from exposure to repeti-
tive, forceful, or awkward motions in the workplace is inconclusive, 
the conclusion that such risk exists is not unduly speculative.96 Sev-
eral comprehensive studies have concluded that occupations involving 
a high degree of repetitiveness and forcefulness of motion create a sub-
stantially increased risk of CTD development in workers.97 While 
OSHA has no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm,98 these 
studies suggest that a significant risk exists that workers in highly re-
petitive, highly forceful jobs will develop CTDs.99 Other evidence, 
however, suggests that no motion, harmless in itself, can produce 
physiological damage in a worker from mere repetition. 100 Yet, be-
94. 448 U.S. at 656. This assertion is supported by the Act, which provides that, while 
OSHA's findings must be based on substantial evidence, OSHA can act on the basis of the best 
available evidence. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5), (t) (1988). 
95. 448 U.S. at 656. The Court's language restricts this freedom to "interpreting ••• data 
with respect to carcinogens." 448 U.S. at 656. The general reasoning, however, supports a po-
tential analogy to other frontier-oriented illnesses or injuries, such as CTDs. In Industrial Union, 
the Secretary failed to carry his initial burden of establishing a significant risk even with this 
leeway because he relied on his own special policy for carcinogens that imposed this burden on 
industry. 448 U.S. at 659. The Court rejected this approach. 448 U.S. at 659, 662. 
96. For example, this conclusion may be less speculative than were the doctor's assumptions 
in extrapolating human risk from animal risk in Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 
1l 27,643, at 35,979-80 (July 23, 1986). 
97. See, e.g., Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 832. This study, evaluating the relationship 
between repetitiveness, forcefulness, and various CTDs, found a "highly significant association" 
between CTDs and the repetitiveness and forcefulness of manual work. Id. Similar, although 
less conclusive, results were obtained in a study of a meatpacking plant. See Masear et al., supra 
note 10, at 225. 
98. "[T)he requirement that a 'significant' risk be identified is not a mathematical straight-
jacket." 448 U.S. at 655. 
99. Participants of Silverstein's study included 652 workers in 39 jobs from seven different 
industrial sites. Categorizing the occupations into four exposure groups based on high or low 
repetitiveness and forcefulness, Silverstein found that the "high force-high repetitive" group had 
more than 15 times the risk of having carpal tunnel syndrome on interview and physical exami-
nation as the "low force-low repetitive" group. Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 349-50. Analy-
sis of the "low force-high repetitive group" and the "high force-low repetitive" group showed 
repetitiveness to be a more important risk factor than force. Id. at 350. Masear's study, while 
less comprehensive, found a similarly striking increase in the incidence of carpal tunnel syn-
drome at the meatpacking plant being observed (14.8%) over that of the general population 
(1%). Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226. 
100. See, e.g., Hadler, supra note 5, at 454. Hadler asserts that there is no evidence that 
repetitive motion can cause an actual injury or anything other than "use-associated arm discom-
fort." See id. His conclusion that repetitive occupational usages pose no significant risk to work-
ers is summarized by Huvelle and Michaelson, who quote Hadler for the proposition that "there 
is precious little data to suggest that such usage increases the likelihood of symptoms [of repeti-
tive stress injuries] beyond that found in ordinary living." Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, 
at 25. 
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cause a "body of reputable scientific thought" embraces the position 
that repetitive and forceful motions pose a significant risk of CTDs, 
OSHA should be able to meet this requirement of the general duty 
clause.IOI 
B. Recognition of Hazard 
OSHA must next show that the hazard is "recognized."I02 Recog-
nized hazard is a term of art with a meaning both peculiar to the Act 
and counterintuitive. I03 The term embodies two separate aspects. I04 
First, a hazard is "recognized" only if the particular employer or its 
industry knows it to be hazardous. Ios For example, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has held that all construction-industry employers are charged 
with knowledge that any "dry" manhole, twenty-four feet deep and 
four feet wide, is a potential hazard; this knowledge satisfies the "rec-
ognition" requirement. I06 Knowledge of the hazard is a matter of ob-
jective determination. I07 OSHA must show that experts in the 
industry would regard the prevention of the hazard as necessary and 
valuable for a sound safety program. Ios 
Second, a hazard is "recognized" only if it is preventable. I09 This 
restriction ensures that the general duty is achievable. I Io A hazard is 
101. While the OSHRC has held the Supreme Court's significant risk test applicable to gen-
eral duty clause cases, it has done little to give substance to that test. The test would certainly be 
met under the considerable leeway given to OSHA for situations on the frontiers of science. See 
supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. The outcome is unclear, however, if the courts will 
not extend that freedom beyond the context of carcinogens. 
102. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988); see National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 
1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
103. Congress vigorously debated inclusion of the term. Representative Steiger, for example, 
argued for "readily apparent" language because "recognized hazard" was so broad and ambigu-
ous as to be "patently unfair." See 116 CoNG. R.Ec. 38,371-72 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger). 
104. Some cases also recognize a third element: the significance of the risk of harm. In U.S. 
Steel Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,517, at 35,669-70 (Mar. 4, 1986), the OSHRC 
noted that while it was agreed that molten metal in contact with water presents a hazard of 
explosions in some circumstances, the hazard is nevertheless "recognized" only when the amount 
of water that can become encapsulated by the molten metal is great enough to make the risk 
significant. This occasional use of a third element adds to the difficulty of determining the con-
tent of recognized hazard. 
105. E.g., Continental Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 446, 448 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 965 (1981); Davey Tree Expert Co., 1983-1984 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1126,852, at 34,399 
(Mar. 30, 1984). 
106. Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1991). 
107. 116 CONG. R.Ec. 38,377 (1970) (statement of Rep. Daniels). 
108. See Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Group, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 
11 27,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986). 
109. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(noting that Congress did not intend unpreventable hazards to be considered "recognized" under 
the clause). Congress also did not intend to make unpreventable instances of hazards "recog-
nized,'' even when the hazard itself is generally recognized. See Cerro Metal Prods. Div., 
Marmon Group, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986). 
110. See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265-66. Restricting the duty to preventable hazards is 
also the only way to promote the Act's goals of notice and fairness. See infra notes 179-80, 205, 
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not preventable, and therefore not recognized, "if it is so idiosyncratic 
and implausible ... that conscientious experts, familiar with the indus-
try, would not take it into account in prescribing a safety program."111 
While an employer's duty is not diminished because a hazard was di-
rectly caused by an employee, certain events, such as equipment-riding 
in contravention of company policy, would be hazards which might 
not be "recognized" - demented or reckless employees may circum-
vent even "the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety re-
gime."112 Additionally, a hazard is neither preventable nor 
"recognized" if its elimination would require methods that are so un-
tested or so expensive that experts would consider them infeasible.113 
CTDs fail to satisfy the "recognition" requirement. Voluntary 
ergonomics programs instituted by some employers do not constitute 
industry recognition of CTDs as a workplace hazard; such programs 
merely constitute a factor in the necessary objective determination.114 
As CTDs increasingly become a part of common knowledge, however, 
an employer's claim that its industry does not have knowledge of the 
potential hazards of repetitive motions will become less plausible. 
Increasing general awareness of CTDs, however, will not similarly 
affect the second aspect of "recognition," preventability, because of 
and accompanying text. Imposing liability for unpreventable hazards would be to impose a sys-
tem of strict liability with an unachievable duty of care. This was clearly not Congress' intent. 
489 F.2d at 1265-66. 
111. 489 F.2d at 1266. 
112. 489 F.2d at 1266 & n.36. 
113. 489 F.2d at 1266 & n.37; see also Morey, supra note 39, at 993 (concluding that employ· 
ers should be allowed the defense that elimination of a hazard is physically or economically 
impossible absent termination of operations); infra note 214 and accompanying text. An exam· 
ple of such a non-"recognized" hazard can be found in Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. 
(CCH) ff 27,605, at 35,872 (June 2, 1986) (hazard of unreacted, explosive chemicals in pressure 
vessels is not "recognized" because the condition is so common in the industry that no measures, 
short of closing down, could eliminate it). See infra notes 116-19. 
Applying these technical restrictions may lead to seemingly incongruent results. For exam· 
ple, there may be a harmful condition that constitutes a hazard and is not covered by a promul-
gated standard, but to which the general duty clause does not apply because the hazard is not 
"recognized." While this result may seem to leave workers unprotected, it is entirely consistent 
with the Act's purpose. Employee protection is not the Act's exclusive goal - protection should 
be sought only when it can be achieved effectively, efficiently, and equitably. See supra note 32 
and accompanying text. 
Policy considerations sometimes determine whether or not the general duty clause should 
apply. For example, Morey notes the importance of the fact that, "despite the Act's solicitude 
for employee welfare," the general duty clause is subject to restrictions such as imposing liability 
only for preventable hazards. See Morey, supra note 39, at 992. His reference to preventability 
implicates issues of fairness and notice. See also BOKAT, supra note 58, at 108 ("Despite the 
breadth of the general duty clause, it does not ... render the employer a guarantor of employee 
safety and health ••.• "). 
114. If a recognized hazard were found solely because an employer took certain precautions 
to avoid that hazard, employers would be discouraged from voluntarily taking any protective 
measures not required by law. Moreover, employers may take voluntary safety measures out of 
an "abundance of caution" rather than out of recognition of a hazard. Such precautions, volun· 
tarily taken, do not prove that an employer would violate the general duty clause if it did not take 
them. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,643, at 35,975 (July 23, 1986). 
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the continuing medical controversies surrounding CTDs. Given the 
current state of scientific knowledge, the preventive value of interven-
tionary measures for CTDs is at best uncertain.115 If CTDs are unpre-
ventable, prosecution of employers under the general duty clause is 
unfair: it penalizes employers for failing to fulfill an unachievable 
duty. 
In Pelron Corp., 116 the court addressed the propriety of a general 
duty citation for a broadly defined hazard - "the possibility of accu-
mulations of unreacted ethylene oxide in pressure vessels." 117 Pelron 
Corporation, a chemicals producer, manufactured its products by mix-
ing either ethylene oxide or propylene oxide with other chemicals in 
chemical reactors, always with the "possibility" that unreacted ethy-
lene oxide would accumulate.118 In vacating the citation, the OSHRC 
found that some industrial activities are dangerous by nature, involv-
ing risks inherent in the conduct of business: 
To permit the normal activities in . . . an industry to be defined as a 
"recognized hazard" within the meaning of [the general duty clause] is 
... almost to prove the Secretary's case by definition, since under such a 
formula the employer can never free the workplace of inherent risks inci-
dent to the business.119 
By this reasoning, because CTDs allegedly develop from normal occu-
pational tasks that are central both to workers' jobs and to their em-
ployers' business, CTDs may fail the "recognition" requirement 
because they are a risk "incident to the business." 
CTDs may also fail the "recognition" requirement because of the 
high cost of implementing OSHA's abatement orders.120 Even if 
OSHA's vague and unproven orders, such as job analysis by an ergo-
nomics committee, 121 can be considered sufficiently effective in 
preventing CTDs, a hazard requiring an abatement method that 
threatens the economic viability of employers should not be consid-
ered "recognized."122 Such a hazard should. instead be remedied 
115. After a comprehensive study, Armstrong, for example, concluded that "the effectiveness 
of preventive job design is still to be demonstrated." Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 835. A 
more detailed discussion of the results of studies of the value of preventive measures appears in 
the subsection concerning the "feasibility of abatement method" requirement. See infra section 
11.C. 
116. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,605 (June 2, 1986). 
117. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,871 (emphasis added). 
118. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,870-71. 
119. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,872. 
120. Compliance with OSHA's abatement orders often costs millions of dollars. See infra 
note 213 and accompanying text. 
121. Ford Motor Company Agrees, supra note 77. Studies indicate that such interventionary 
measures have no significant impact on the reduction of CTDs. See infra notes 133-41 and 
accompanying text. 
122. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 & n.37 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
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through the promulgation process. 
C. Feasibility of Abatement Method 
OSHA must also demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of 
specific abatement measures to prove a general duty violation.123 In 
effect, OSHA must demonstrate what the cited employer should have 
done to reduce the risk of harm, 124 specifying the particular measures 
that the employer should have taken to avoid citation.125 In addition, 
OSHA must demonstrate that safety experts would regard its pro-
posed abatement method as "necessary and valuable for a sound safety 
program in the particular circumstances existing at the employer's 
worksite."126 Evidence that an abatement method is not feasible may 
include, for example, proof of the idiosyncratic or implausible nature 
of the hazard or evidence that the abatement method is untested or 
overly expensive.121 
In John Gill Ranch, 12s which presented facts similar to those in 
CTD cases, OSHA had cited an employer under the general duty 
clause because its employees worked in stooped postures while pulling 
weeds by hand in a spinach field. 129 Although the OSHRC found that 
working in such a posture was a recognized hazard in California, 130 it 
123. See Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986). A 
satisfactory abatement measure may be designed either to eliminate the hazard or, where appro-
priate, materially to reduce the hazard. See 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,871. OSHA 
must necessarily establish both the feasibility and the utility of the abatement method. See, e.g., 
FMC Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,686, at 36,118 (Aug. 28, 1986) (finding that, 
while "the Secretary established the feasibility of relocating the [nitrogen trichloride transfer] 
lines [to reduce the danger of explosion from exposure to high temperatures], ••• the evidence 
fail[ed) to establish the likely utility of this abatement measure"). 
124. For example, in FMC Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,686 (Aug. 28, 1986), 
the OSHRC found the lack of a formal training program insufficient proof that FMC's informal 
training methods were inadequate; the Secretary had to prove in addition that any suggested 
formalization of the training process would materially reduce the risk of harm. "The question is 
one of substance, not form." 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 36,116-17. 
125. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
126. Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Group, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 
ff 27,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986). "The question is whether a precaution is recognized by safety 
experts as feasible ••.. " National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266 n.37. In Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,605 (June 2, 1986), the OSHRC vacated a general duty citation because, 
while the Secretary criticized Pelron's established safety program as inadequate, 1986-1987 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,873-74, he failed to prove that safety experts in the field would have 
prescribed additional training measures that would have materially reduced the risk of harm and 
therefore failed to show the feasibility and likely utility of an abatement method. 1986-1987 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,872. 
127. See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266. 
128. 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 28,796 (Nov. 1, 1986). 
129. Working in an awkward position is sometimes stated as a factor possibly contributing to 
CTDs. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note l, at 292. The case is treated as merely analogous to 
CTDs, however, because posture has been found insignificant in the development of CTDs, see 
Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 832, and because the reported decision does not refer to CTDs. 
130. John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 38,391. Hazards usually are defined 
narrowly and have restrictions on the "recognition" element, most commonly by industry. See, 
June 1992] Note - Cumulative Trauma Disorders 2097 
vacated the citation because the Secretary failed to prove that use of a 
long-handled hoe was a feasible means of abatement. Specifically, the 
Secretary failed to demonstrate that safety experts in the agriculture 
industry would regard a long-handled hoe as necessary and appropri-
ate for spinach cultivation.131 Instead, the evidence showed that a 
long-handled hoe would destroy the spinach crop and enhance weed 
growth by displacing herbicide and was, therefore, infeasible. In addi-
tion, a long-handled hoe would not necessarily reduce stooped work 
because of the need to remove weeds after harvesting.132 
The occupational factors that allegedly cause CTDs present the 
same sort of difficulties for OSHA abatement orders as those found in 
John Gill Ranch. The lack of definitive scientific evidence regarding 
the effect of interventionary measures on the development of CTDs133 
prevents OSHA from formulating a demonstrably feasible and useful 
means of abatement. Silverstein's comprehensive study of occupa-
tional CTDs, examining whether the elimination of any work-related 
risk factors134 leads to a reduction in the incidence of CTDs, found 
that the implementation of ergonomics interventions over a three-year 
period caused no statistically significant improvements in CTDs.135 
Others studying the problem have reached similar conclusions.136 The 
strongest statement from the major studies is that certain measures 
"may" reduce the incidence of CTDs.137 
OSHA's abatement orders for CTDs fail the feasibility require-
ment. These orders typically include broad recommendations for im-
proving ergonomics practices across all aspects of an employer's 
operations, leaving specific application to the employer.138 When 
e.g., St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981) (permitting a freight 
elevator to operate with the doors and gates open is a recognized hazard in the lead smelting 
industry). John Gill Ranch's restriction on hazard "recognition" to California is not 
extraordinary. 
131. John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 38,391. 
132. 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 38,391. 
133. See, e.g., Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226 (concluding, after a study of the potential 
causes of carpal tunnel syndrome with a view toward instituting preventive measures, that "[t]he 
major question is still unresolved. If the work environment is responsible for this high incidence 
of [carpal tunnel syndrome], how must this be changed to resolve the problem?"). 
134. Work-related risk factors for CTDs include repetitiveness, forcefulness, awkward pos-
ture, and vibration. Silverstein et al., supra note 7, at 838. 
135. Id. at 844. 
136. See Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 835 (emphasizing that "the effectiveness of pre-
ventive job design is still to be demonstrated"); Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226 (stating that 
the question of preventive measures is "still unresolved"). While claiming that ergonomics inter-
vention is a "pressing need," Hadler warns that such intervention in Australia over a period of 
five years has had, with rare exception, no discernible impact on slowing the dramatic increase in 
CTDs. Hadler, supra note 5, at 454-55. 
137. Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 356. The authors note that their findings can be help-
ful in directing workplace interventions because they suggest a prevention strategy: intervention 
at the job level. This strategy, however, lacks practical direction due to its generality. 
138. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. 
2098 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2079 
Ford Motor Company settled its general duty citation with OSHA, for 
example, Ford agreed to implement an ergonomics program involving 
such measures as job-analysis by joint labor-management ergonomics 
committees, engineering controls, a medical management program, 
and employee training and education. 139 These agreements are neither 
hazard-specific nor even employer-specific but rather are a "broad rec-
ipe for CTD reduction" lacking practical direction.140 The unresolved 
medical questions concerning causation and prevention not only keep 
OSHA from issuing more refined abatement orders, but also make it 
difficult for OSHA to ensure that its broad orders will have the pre-
dicted result.141 
In the context of CTDs, OSHA is unable to address specific 
problems through abatement orders because particular methods will 
likely prove infeasible.142 For example, job rotation, which is a com-
mon1y cited preventive measure, 143 is usually infeasible in an industrial 
setting because of the seniority required in most industries to obtain a 
job change.144 Moreover, a decrease in the production rate or a de-
crease in repetitions per shift to ease the strain on workers is usually 
infeasible because of the industrial employer's need for a high produc-
tion rate from each employee to make a profit.145 
If OSHA instead issues a broad order, employers will be able to 
satisfy the general duty clause too easily. An employer can fulfill 
much of OSHA's order by maintaining a basic employee training pro-
gram and a staff engineer who implements limited ergonomics sugges-
tions.146 If OSHA cites an employer who has implemented these 
modest programs, OSHA has the virtually impossible task of proving 
that any incremental increase in the stringency of the programs will 
have a material impact on the reduction of CTDs. 147 Given the lack 
139. Ford Motor Company Agrees, supra note 77. 
140. Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. 
141. See id. 
142. This criticism assumes that OSHA possesses the physical capability to make particular· 
ized orders; it probably does not. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
143. See, e.g., George Lutz & Terri Hansford, Cumulative Trauma Disorder Controls: The 
Ergonomics Program at Ethicon, Inc., 12 J. HAND SURGERY 863, 864 (1987) (stating that job 
rotation is a common job modification in Ethicon's voluntary ergonomics program). 
144. See Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226. 
145. Id. 
146. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. Thus, employers can satisfy OSHA's abatement 
orders despite the lack of objective scientific evidence that such measures are effective. See supra 
notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
147. The difficulty of succeeding with such proof can be seen in general duty clause cases in 
other contexts. In one case, for example, the OSHRC stated that "[i]f an employer has a safety 
program designed to eliminate a recognized hazard, the burden is on the Secretary to 'specify the 
[additional] steps a cited employer should have taken to avoid citation, and to demonstrate the 
feasibility and likely utility of those measures.'" Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Group, Inc., 
1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986) (quoting National Realty & 
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The OSHRC held that the 
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of evidence that these broad programs effectively reduce CTDs, 
OSHA will inevitably fail to carry its burden of proof under the gen-
eral duty clause. 
Even if these difficulties are met, OSHA's abatement orders are 
demonstrably very costly to implement.148 While the most profitable 
employers may be able to afford such programs, employers with fewer 
resources will be less able to comply and may thus be forced out of 
business. In a situation such as this, the general duty clause is an inap-
propriate means to enforce the Act.149 
OSHA's inability to articulate a demonstrably feasible abatement 
method for CTDs, however, does not undercut the viability of an ergo-
nomics standard. The promulgation process provides the Secretary 
with more resources than are available to OSHA, including access to 
extensive research and commentary on the hazard.150 This process 
presents the better means of discovering an abatement method for 
CTDs, if one exists. If one does not exist, the promulgation process 
still provides a more attractive alternative than the general duty clause 
because it will produce a more comprehensive and mutually agreeable 
solution to the problem.151 
D. Causation of Death or Serious Physical Harm 
Finally, the hazard must cause or be likely to cause death or seri-
ous physical harm to sustain a general duty violation.152 This require-
ment embodies two independent elements: the causation of the hazard 
and the seriousness of the hazard. Causation of a hazard cannot be 
reduced to a mathematical test153 - the proper test is one of plausibil-
ity, not probability.154 The proper standard of review is whether 
Secretary failed to carry this burden and vacated the citation. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 
35,829; see also Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,605, at 35,870 (June 2, 1986) 
(vacating a general duty citation because the Secretary failed to establish that the risk could have 
been materially reduced by changes in Pe!ron's training program); FMC Corp., 1986-1987 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,686, at 36,116 (Aug. 28, 1986) (finding that the Secretary failed to 
establish that FMC's training methods were inadequate and vacating a general duty citation). 
148. Companywide ergonomics programs often cost millions of dollars. See infra note 213 
and accompanying text. The programs involved in these statistics are those that an employer 
must implement to comply with a valid general duty citation. They are more substantial than the 
minimal measures that would be sufficient to prevent OSHA from sustaining a general duty 
citation in the first place. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
149. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 212-14. 
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(3) (1988). OSHA's ability to conduct research and formulate 
abatement orders is restricted by its relatively small size and limited resources. See infra note 
197 and accompanying text. 
151. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text. 
152. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988); see Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,605, 
at 35,871 (June 2, 1986). 
153. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
154. Morey, supra note 39, at 997-98 (noting that the most sensible test is "whether reason-
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workplace conditions could cause serious physical harm upon "other 
than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of 
circumstances."155 
While significant questions of causation may persist, 156 the causa-
tion element presents a low hurdle for CTDs. Given the extraordinary 
number of repetitive motions that many employees must perform,157 
the causal link between such usages and the development of CTDs can 
sensibly be described as plausible, and is by no means implausible or 
"freakish." For example, the Seventh Circuit has stated that "drawing 
a reasonable inference of causation [in a case involving the sufficiency 
of evidence in a complaint alleging neck and wrist injuries from work-
ing on an assembly line] does not necessarily require more 'expertise' 
than deciding that leaking sewer gases are unhealthy or that objects 
that are stacked too high create a danger to the employees below."158 
CTDs, however, most likely fail the general duty clause's "serious-
ness" element. The clause only protects against hazards that are caus-
ing or are likely to cause "death or serious physical harm." 159 
According to OSHA's own definition, a serious physical harm is one 
in which part of the body is made "functionally useless" or is "sub-
ably foreseeable circumstances could lead to the perceived hazard's resulting in serious physical 
harm or death"). Questions remain, however, as to which standard will be used in any particular 
case. See BoKAT, supra note 58, at 113, 132. 
155. National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.33. The explanation for the exemption of freakish 
mishaps from statutory liability is one of policy: because the goal of the Act is preventive and 
not remedial, In re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 
(7th Cir. 1990), liability should not attach to unforeseeable or "freakish" injuries because such 
responsive action serves no useful preventive purpose; although "caused" by the workplace con-
ditions, they are unpreventable. See Morey, supra note 39, at 1001. 
156. Causation problems emanate from the number and variety of potential contributing 
causal factors. See, e.g., Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 343 (listing potential occupational and 
nonoccupational factors for carpal tunnel syndrome). Some experts find a strong association 
between CTDs and occupational repetitiveness and forcefulness. See id. at 353 (finding that 
repetitiveness and forcefulness were strongly associated with carpal tunnel syndrome as risk fac-
tors); see supra note 99. Others, however, insist that little scientific proof exists that occupation is 
a significant risk factor. See, e.g., Hadler, supra note 12, at 39 (finding no relation between 
occupational usage and disorders of the forearm, shoulder, elbow and neck). 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4. 
158. In re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1154 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). While the standard of causation involved in that case is the ad-
ministrative probable cause necessary for securing an inspection warrant, which requires less 
evidence of causation than does proof of a violation of the Act, see West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. 
Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit's view of the intuitive relation 
between repetitive occupational usages and CTDs should satisfy the plausibility required by the 
"causation" element of the general duty clause. 
159. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988). Huvelle and Michaelson claim that by using the phrase 
"death or serious physical harm," Congress intended to restrict the general duty clause to 
hazards that were at least potentially deadly. Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25. While 
the case Jaw seems to support this contention, OSHA's manual apparently rejects it. See OSHA, 
REVISED FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL IV-21, IV-22 (1989) (listing such factors as "bone frac-
ture" among those that can constitute serious physical harm); infra note 160. The legislative 
history is inconclusive. 
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stantially reduced in efficiency."160 
The case law reveals the high degree of seriousness required under 
the clause. For example, a sixty-foot fall hazard caused by an em-
ployer allowing an employee to wear a tom and frayed safety belt 
while working outside a wire rope guardrail is likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm.161 Permitting work on slippery platforms ap-
proximately five feet above a roadway, by comparison, is not.162 Fly-
ing metal fragments launched by a steel mill coiler twenty feet from 
maintenance workers are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm.163 Failing to protect employees, working with molten metal in 
95-degree fahrenheit temperatures, from the effects of heat stress is 
also likely to cause death or serious physical harm.164 Assaults from 
mental patients, by contrast, which inflict scratches, bruises, bites, 
hairpulling, broken blood veins, choking, bruised eyeballs, concus-
sions, sprained shoulders, and swollen arms, are not likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm.16s 
While CTDs sometimes impair sensory, autonomic, and motor 
functions, and occasionally result in permanent disabilities, extreme 
injury is rare. The variety of CTDs and their associated symptoms 
have been described as "discomforts."166 While that label may trivial-
ize these conditions, the fact that CTDs lack the life-threatening grav-
ity167 found in the case law suggests that CTDs are not the type of 
serious injury that Congress intended to protect against with the gen-
eral duty clause.168 Nor can the recent dramatic rise in the number of 
reported CTDs alone satisfy the seriousness element. Other explana-
tions may account for the increase, such as recent changes in record-
160. OSHA, REVISED FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL IV-21 (1989). The manual cites several 
examples of injuries that can constitute serious physical harm: amputation; concussion; internal 
crushing; bone fracture; bum; and cut, laceration, or puncture involving significant bleeding or 
requiring suturing. Id. at IV-21, IV-22. 
161. Greer Architectural Prods., Inc., 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 28,601 (June 2, 
1989). 
162. Mohican Trucking Co., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 24,514 (May 27, 1980). 
163. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 24,724 (Aug. 13, 1980). 
164. Duriron Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 750 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984). The court reasoned 
that heat exhaustion could cause an employee to faint and fall against molten metal or moving 
machinery. 750 F.2d at 30. 
165. Meier v. Department of Social Servs., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 23,324 (Feb. 8, 1979). 
166. See Hadler, supra note 5, at 454 (claiming that CTDs of the arms are responsible merely 
for "mild to modest transitory nuisance"); see also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
167. See, e.g., Hadler, supra note 12, at 38 (asserting that CTDs do not cause any specific 
musculoskeletal damage). Hadler, after reviewing the results of Silverstein's research, notes that 
the Jack of any irreversible structural change in use-related tendinitis suggests that the condition 
would more appropriately be labeled "wrist soreness." Id. at 39. 
168. See Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25 (concluding that since CTDs that dis-
able or debilitate are the exception rather than the rule, case Jaw and common sense clearly 
reveal that they are not the type of serious injury intended to be protected against by the general 
duty clause). For an explanation of the various types of CTDs suffered, see supra notes 11-13 
and accompanying text. 
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keeping requirements. 169 While some CTDs genuinely disable their 
victims, CTDs as a whole probably fail to satisfy the "seriousness" 
requirement. 
Because CTDs fail to satisfy the general duty clause's four-part 
test, OSHA should not be allowed to use the clause to prosecute em-
ployers for CTDs. The absence of an ergonomics standard fails to 
justify reliance on the clause for CTDs; the clause was not intended to 
substitute for standards. 170 Promulgated standards are the appropri-
ate remedy and the Secretary should initiate that process if a remedy is 
warranted. 171 
III. THE .ARGUMENT FOR AN ERGONOMICS STANDARD 
OSHA's use of the general duty clause despite the failure of CTDs 
to satisfy the clause's requirements has consequences beyond those of 
a simple technical violation of the law. By continuing to use the clause 
for CTDs, OSHA undermines the Act's basic policy goals. These 
goals dictate a different course of action that would not only uphold 
the Act's policies but also better achieve the purpose of protecting 
workers. This Part argues that the policy goals of the Act require the 
Secretary to promulgate an ergonomics standard to protect workers 
from CTDs. Section III.A demonstrates that OSHA's use of the gen-
eral duty clause to prosecute alleged ergonomics violations is ineffec-
tive and unfair. The promulgation process, however, provides OSHA 
the means to develop a beneficial, consistent, and fair ergonomics stan-
dard that will protect workers as Congress intended. 
Section III.B anticipates and responds to the criticism that cessa-
tion of prosecutions under the general duty clause would leave work-
ers unprotected. This section argues that the policy reasons favoring 
an ergonomics standard over application of the general duty clause 
maintain their force even in the absence of a presently available ergo-
nomics standard. This Part concludes that OSHA should stop prose-
cuting employers for alleged ergonomics violations under the general 
duty clause and should instead promulgate an ergonomics standard. 
169. In the late 1980s, OSHA began issuing huge fines for recordkeeping violations of the 
Act. Out of fear of this new policy, employers began keeping very careful records of everything 
that might be considered a CTD. Then "[w]hat happened was OSHA suddenly said, Look, you 
have all these reported cases of cumulative trauma disorders. Therefore, you have knowledge of 
a hazard in your workplace and that satisfies the recognized hazard element." Malovany, supra 
note 17, at 30 (comments of Nina Stillman, attorney with the law firm representing Pepperidge 
Farm in its challenge of a general duty citation). There is no sudden increase in the danger of 
CTDs in workplaces, the argument continues, and what has been characterized as a sudden, 
serious phenomenon can be viewed as merely "a classic case of bootstrapping." Id. 
170. BoKAT, supra note 58, at 109. 
171. See infra section III.A. 
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A. The Underlying Policies of the Act 
Three specific policies provide the basis for the primary enforce-
ment role of promulgated standards: notice, consistency, and fairness. 
The promulgation process, unlike the general duty clause, provides the 
Secretary with a means to address the special problems of CTDs while 
upholding the policies of the Act. 
1. Notice 
Promulgated standards provide clear guidance to OSHA inspec-
tors investigating for violations172 and provide notice to employers 
protecting against violations.173 Concerned that the complexities of 
modem industry would obfuscate what is expected of employers, Con-
gress designed the promulgation mechanism to provide employers 
with a degree of certainty with respect to both the content of their 
obligations and the process by which their obligations are deter-
mined.174 Arguing for the merits of promulgating specific standards, 
Representative Steiger explained that "[w]ith specific standards it will 
be apparent to the employer what is expected and required ofhim."175 
Because of the "notice-and-comment" provisions of the Act's pro-
mulgation procedures,176 a specific ergonomics standard would be the 
subject of public debate. All interested parties could fashion an ac-
ceptable, well-informed, 177 and comprehensive standard, taking into 
account CTDs' controversial medical issues.178 By notifying employ-
172. 116 CoNG. REc. 38,371 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) ("[S]pecific standards will 
. . • serve as the necessary guide for inspectors in properly carrying out their investigatory 
duties."). 
173. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 36, at 252. 
174. See 116 CoNG. REc. 38,371 (1970) ("It is exactly this complexity [in today's highly 
technical industrial circumstances], and the uncertainty which often goes with it, that has led us 
to provide carefully designed procedures for issuing specific safety and health standards.") (state-
ment of Rep. Steiger). The procedures require, in part, that the Secretary of Labor publish all 
proposed rules promulgating specific standards in the Federal Register. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2) 
(1988). Publishing in the Federal Register has been held to constitute notice to all employers. 
See, e.g., Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the OSHA "confined space" regulation has put the construction industry on notice that any 
"sanitary" or "dry" manhole that is 24 feet deep and four feet wide is a potential hazard and that 
all construction employers are charged with knowledge of the regulation and are responsible for 
compliance); North Ala. Express, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) 
("Assuming that the contents of the published notice are otherwise complete, it is well settled 
that publications in the Federal Register are deemed legally sufficient notice to all interested 
persons."). Another important part of the promulgation procedures is the opportunity for public 
hearings, comments, and objections by interested parties. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(3) (1988). 
175. 116 CoNG. REc. 38,371 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger). 
176. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(3) (1988) (providing for the opportunity to comment on, submit 
data about, and register objections to a proposed standard). 
177. Standards are to be based on "research, experiments, demonstrations, past experience, 
and the latest available scientific data." S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted 
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5183. 
178. Huvelle and Michaelson prefer this notice-and-comment approach of promulgated stan-
dards to the general duty clause because it would enable OSHA to resolve the difficult issues 
2104 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2079 
ers of their responsibilities, an ergonomics standard would enable em-
ployers to take direct and specific measures to protect the safety and 
health of their workers, thus achieving the main goal of the Act. 
From a policy standpoint, the shortcomings of the general duty 
clause with respect to CTDs demonstrate the wisdom of Congress' de-
cision to emphasize the promulgation of standards to deal with even 
new harmful conditions. Absent an ergonomics standard, employers 
have no notice as to what steps to take to reduce CTDs. Prosecution 
under the general duty clause subjects employers to liability for a 
"wrong" which they may not know how to correct. 179 The OSHRC 
recognizes this deficiency of the general duty clause: "Reliance upon 
the general duty clause [is] discouraged because to do so would pro-
vide little advanced warning of what specifically is required in order 
that employers could maintain a safe and healthful workplace."180 Be-
cause employers do not know what is required of them to maintain a 
workplace free of CTDs, their employees' safety and health depend 
upon whether their employer "guesses correctly" as to an acceptable 
prevention method181 or is willing to implement the universe of poten-
tial preventive actions. Neither condition is likely to occur. 
Only through the promulgation of an ergonomics standard, result-
ing from a comprehensive and informed debate, can a definitive and 
useful method of reducing the number and severity of workplace 
CTDs be formulated, made known to employers, and revised and im-
proved as medical knowledge develops. The general duty clause pro-
vides no equally well-reasoned solution to the CTD problem. 
2. Consistency 
CTDs affect workers across a range of industries, from meatpack-
ing to manufacturing to microtechnology.182 All jobs involving repeti-
tive tasks are likely to have a higher incidence of CTDs. 183 To be 
concerning CTDs, such as causation, prevention, and the extent of harm caused. See Huvelle & 
Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25. But cf RONALD A. CASS & COLIN s. DIVER, ADMINISTRA· 
TIVE LAW 15 (1987) (noting that promulgation under the Act can be "excruciatingly slow and 
extraordinarily expensive"). 
179. Huvelle and Michaelson state that "it is far from clear precisely what is expected of 
employers." Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24. Because OSHA has proceeded under 
the general duty clause instead of issuing a standard, "[e]mployers are ..• hard pressed to know 
how to tcy to reduce CTDs." Id. 
180. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27, 
1973). Referring to reliance on the general duty clause when no notice is available, the OSHRC 
concluded that "the purposes of the Act would be ill served by such a situation." 1973-1974 
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 21,261. 
181. See Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25. 
182. Other frequently-cited industries include the food processing, automobile parts, elec-
tronics assembly, and newspaper industries, as well as white-collar businesses, both high-tech and 
low-tech. Id. at 24. 
183. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 293; see Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 353. 
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effective, the means of reducing and preventing CTDs must serve vari-
ous occupations in a range of distinctly different workplaces. 
Congress intended to remedy the consequences of inconsistencies 
in workplace conditions existent in pre-Act industry by imposing uni-
form safety and health standards.184 An ergonomics standard for gen-
eral industry would clarify the duty of all relevant employers185 and 
require compliance.186 By extending protection to all employees, an 
ergonomics standard would effectuate the Act's purpose of assuring 
safe and healthful workplaces so far as possible and would establish a 
uniformity of workplace ergonomics conditions currently lacking.187 
One difficulty with protecting against CTDs is their occurrence in 
varied industries. An ergonomics standard can overcome this obsta-
cle. Through the extensive research provisions of the Act, 188 the Sec-
retary has at her disposal the resources most likely to identify the 
equipment, tasks, or other relevant factors that seem to cause CTDs 
and through which she will most likely be able to formulate an appro-
priate standard.189 Applicability would depend on manufacturing op-
erations and uses of various technologies. Through this process, an 
ergonomics standard would systematically cover all workplaces that 
present a significant risk190 of causing CTDs.19 1 
The general duty clause, by contrast, fails to account for the wide-
spread incidence of CTDs because OSHA does not, and probably can-
184. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5218 (individual views of Senator Javits) (recognizing the inadequate protection provided by 
leaving workplace safety and health to private industry and the states, and the resulting need for 
a strong federal program). 
185. The Secretary has the capacity to promulgate standards that apply to any number of 
industries. See BOKAT, supra note 58, at 65, 167 {discussing the distinction between "vertical" 
and "horizontal" standards). The term relevant employers refers to those employers in the indus-
tries to which an ergonomics standard would apply. 
186. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1988); see Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 
1272 (11th Cir. 1991) Qtolding that all employers to whom a duly promulgated standard applies 
are "responsible for compliance"). 
187. For example, while most noncited employers have no significant program, those em-
ployers faced with multimillion dollar fines typically settle and agree to implement some sort of 
ergonomics program. See, e.g., CAL/OSHA Issue Special Order on VDT Use at San Diego News-
paper, Reaches Settlement Agreement on VDT Safety with Fresno Newspaper, [1990 Transfer 
Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,631, at 13,497 {describing the terms of Fresno 
Bee's joint ergonomics agreement with OSHA). In some cases, however, an employer might 
voluntarily adopt an ergonomics program without first being cited. See, e.g., Lutz & Hansford, 
supra note 143 (describing Ethicon's self-imposed ergonomics program); Ford Motor Company 
Agrees, supra note 77 (discussing Ford Motor Co.'s settled ergonomics agreement). 
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(3) (1988). 
189. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. Reference to a single ergonomics stan-
dard is not intended to preclude the possibility - and probability - of multiple ergonomics 
standards. See supra note 33. 
190. The Secretary may promulgate a standard for any hazard that poses a significant risk of 
harm. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. 
191. See BOKAT, supra note 58, at 167-68 (discussing "specific" standards, which are applica-
ble to particular equipment or operations). 
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not,192 apply it consistently. Despite Congress' admonition that the 
general duty clause "should not be used to set ad hoc standards,"193 
OSHA's use of the clause against employers such as IBP, Inc., Ford 
Motor Company, and Perdue Farms194 has prompted criticism that 
OSHA is selectively prosecuting nationally prominent employers and 
imposing excessive fines solely for media attention.195 This misuse of 
the general duty clause forgoes the benefits of consistency offered by 
promulgated standards, which are preferred to "adventurous" en-
forcement of the clause.196 
Aside from OSHA's alleged motives, OSHA clearly does not have 
the capacity to police and inspect all employers.197 As a result, it must 
choose which employers to target. 198 While the general duty clause 
may have an impact on workplace conditions of employers cited by 
OSHA, 199 other employers lack notice of what is expected to discharge 
their general duty.200 Reliance on ad hoc enforcement under the gen-
192. OSHA's size limitations affect its ability to enforce the general duty clause consistently 
against all relevant employers. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
193. 116 CONG. REc. 42,206 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger); see also Kastalon, Inc., 
1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,971 (July 23, 1986) (stating that specific standards 
are preferred over the broad mandate of the general duty clause). 
194. NIOSH Investigates Ergonomic Hazards at Poultry Processing Plants in North Carolina, 
[1990 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,592 (report of NIOSH investi· 
gation of alleged ergonomics violations at Perdue Farms poultry processing plants). 
195. "OSHA's strategy of imposing multi-million dollar fines in conjunction with vague and 
untested means of abatement appear more designed to garner media attention and satisfy polit-
ical pressures than to improve workers' safety in a prompt, efficient and effective manner." 
House Hearings, supra note 6, at 28 (statement of Perdue Farms, Inc.); see also Malovany, supra 
note 17, at 30 (employer's attorney claiming that the recent increase in penalty amounts for 
general duty violations for CTDs was the result of "a fundamental change in political winds on 
the national level"). Whatever the validity of these claims, OSHA is aware of the publicity and 
uses the high-profile aspect of its citations to influence the behavior of other employers. Huvelle 
and Michaelson report that Gerard Scannell, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational 
Safety and Health, commented that he wanted the 111 citations and $242,000 in penalties against 
Cargill, Inc. (for exposing workers to CTDs) "to send a strong message" to employers. Huvelle 
& Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24. While general deterrence is an accepted goal of punishment 
in certain cases, the intended "message" in the case of CTDs remains confused and inarticulate 
- without an ergonomics standard or any other definitive notice of how to protect against 
CTDs, noncited employers are unable to conform their behavior to protect workers. See supra 
notes 179-81 and accompanying text. The doubtful utility of its high-profile approach to enforce· 
ment may cast doubt on the credibility of OSHA's general deterrence motives. 
196. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
197. House Panel Hears Testimony on Cumulative Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] 
Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,112, at 12,229 (June 6, 1989) (noting a criticism of the 
number of OSHA's investigatory and enforcement personnel). 
198. While stating that OSHA's inspections are "more or less systematic," Gross notes that 
OSHA targets industries with above-average injury-frequency rates, the so-called "worst first" 
approach to enforcement. Gross, supra note 36, at 257 n.52, 258 n.56. 
199. In an ordinary general duty case, citations almost invariably improve the safety and 
health of workplaces. For CTDs, however, the likely utility of any abatement method is still 
uncertain. See supra section 11.C. 
200. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text. 
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eral duty clause likely results in some workers' being left unpro-
tected, 201 thereby frustrating the purpose of the Act. Congress 
recognized the undercutting effect on workplace safety and health aris-
ing from inconsistent programs: "[M]any employers - particularly 
smaller ones - simply cannot make the necessary investment in 
health and safety, and survive competitively, unless all are compelled 
to do so. "202 By providing a clear and consistent obligation for all 
relevant employers, an ergonomics standard would increase the likeli-
hood203 that the employees of noncited employers204 would be pro-
tected from CTDs. 
3. Fairness 
The controversy and uncertainty surrounding the causation of 
CTDs and the means by which they can be reduced or eliminated 
make prosecution under the general duty clause unfair.205 Perhaps 
even more significantly, enforcement under the clause often sacrifices 
fair procedure. Currently, OSHA issues citations and proposed penal-
ties to employers upon discovering levels of CTD exposure that OSHA 
believes violate the general duty clause.206 OSHA has the authority 
and, depending on how it categorizes the violation, the responsibility 
to assess penalties of up to $70,000 for each violation.201 The citation 
201. Given OSHA's tendency to prosecute large, prominent employers, the unprotected 
workers will most likely be those of small to medium-sized employers. Voluntary ergonomics 
agreements with these employers will probably be rare, often for economic reasons. See infra 
note 202; cf. Lutz & Hansford, supra note 143, at 863 (stating that Ethicon, Inc., which entered a 
voluntary ergonomics agreement, is the worldwide leading manufacturer of sutures and wound 
closure products). 
202. S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5180. The need to offset this inconsistency with a standard is even more pronounced in the 
context of CTDs because of their long latency period. "[W]here there is a long period between 
exposure to a hazard and manifestation of an illness[,] .•. a particular employer has no economic 
incentive to invest in current precautions ... because he will seldom have to pay for the conse-
quences of his own neglect." Id. 
203. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
204. Employees working for cited employers would also benefit from an ergonomics standard 
because their employers would be able to take appropriate steps to avoid being cited again. With-
out an ergonomics standard, preemptive measures by any employer are, if not impossible, at least 
undefined. See Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24. 
205. "[I]t is grossly unfair to employers to subject them to the possibility of a civil penalty for 
not complying with a general requirement as vague as a mandate 'to do good and avoid evil.' " 
116 CoNG. R.Ec. 38,371 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger). 
206. 29 U.S.C. §§ 658(a), 659(a) (1988); see, e.g., Maakestad & Helm, supra note 12, at 10-11 
(describing the citation of IBP, Inc. and John Morrell & Co. for ergonomics violations). 
207. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1991). This section of the Act prescribes different 
penalties for "willful or repeated" violations, "serious" violations, and "not serious" violations. 
OSHA has attempted to characterize most ergonomics violations as willful, the most serious kind 
of violation. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. Any general duty violation must at least be a 
"serious" violation. BOKAT, supra note 58, at 109. In addition, in egregious cases, OSHA has 
begun calculating the imposed penalty by multiplying the statutory penalty by the number of 
employees exposed to the CTD, resulting in the assessment of extraordinarily large fines. Free-
man, supra note 29, at 28. 
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and proposed penalty become final unless the employer contests their 
legitimacy within the time provided.2os 
The special characteristics of CTDs, however, negate the fairness 
that Congress intended by this two-step process. Persistent uncertain-
ties regarding possible means of abatement of CTDs render the Act's 
appeal provisions ineffectual. Neither NIOSH, the Secretary of La-
bor's researching agency, nor most employers are confident of the pre-
ventive value of CTD interventionary measures, which are largely 
untested.209 While courts and the OSHRC may occasionally vacate a 
citation because OSHA's abatement method was insuffi.cient,210 re-
viewing bodies are poorly equipped to evaluate the utility of OSHA's 
orders. Most cases settle before courts reach this determination.211 
Unless employers comply with OSHA's typically general and often ar-
bitrary abatement orders,212 they are subjected to large penalties. In 
addition to the uncertainties concerning the utility of OSHA's abate-
ment orders, compliance often costs substantial sums of money.213 Es-
pecially because CTD precautionary measures threaten the economic 
viability of many employers, fairness dictates that OSHA should pro-
mulgate a standard in accordance with the Act's procedural safe-
guards. 214 An ergonomics standard would combat these uncertainties 
with procedural scrutiny.21s 
The OSHRC has emphasized the role of fairness in the promulga-
208. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1988). 
209. See, e.g., NIOSH Seeks Information on Occupational Cumulative Trauma Disorders, 
[1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,292, at 12,608 (request by 
NIOSH for information regarding prevention and intervention procedures for use with CTDs); 
House Hearing, supra note 6, at 28 (statement of Perdue Farms, Inc.) (noting that abatement 
theories are unproven and that OSHA admits to lack of expertise to deal with CTDs). After 
conducting a study of the contribution of occupational risk factors to the development of CTDs, 
Silverstein found that "[a]lthough some ergonomic interventions were implemented in the 
plantL] .•. this investigation was not able to identify statistically significant improvements in 
CTDs that could be attributed to decreases in risk factors." Silverstein et al., supra note 7, at 
844. 
210. See, e.g., John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 28,796, at 38,391 (Nov. 1, 
1989), discussed supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
211. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. 
212. See id. (noting that OSHA's abatement orders in CTD citations are broadly stated and 
that OSHA lacks the expertise to refine or direct the orders). 
213. The employers settling their general duty citations and fines with OSHA typically must 
spend millions of dollars to implement the broad, vague, and still unproven ergonomics programs 
contained in OSHA's abatement orders. For example, Mallory and Bradford quote the Execu-
tive Vice-President of IBP, Inc. as reporting that the cost of implementing the ergonomics pro-
gram in its settlement with OSHA will exceed one or two million dollars. Mallory & Bradford, 
supra note l, at 93. Similarly, Chrysler Corp.'s settlement agreement with OSHA involves imple-
menting a company-wide ergonomics program costing millions of dollars. Huvelle & Michael-
son, supra note 17, at 24. 
214. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
215. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 
5182. 
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tion process. In Kastalon, Inc., 216 the OSHRC reviewed an alleged 
violation of the general duty clause. OSHA contended that Kastalon 
violated its general duty by failing to take adequate measures to pro-
tect its employees from a dangerous chemical commonly called 
"MOCA." No specific standard governed MOCA exposure; twelve 
years earlier, in Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. 
Brennan, 217 the Third Circuit had declared a previously issued stan-
dard invalid because the Secretary had failed to conform to the Act's 
procedural requirements for promulgation.218 The decisive procedural 
flaw had been the Secretary's failure to provide interested parties with 
an adequate opportunity to review the advisory committee's recom-
mendations before submitting comments or taking part in the hear-
ings.219 In Kastalon, the OSHRC criticized OSHA's citations as an 
attempt to enforce the invalidated standard through the general duty 
clause, thus circumventing the Act's fairness goal,220 although the 
OSHRC vacated the citation on other grounds. 221 As demonstrated 
by these cases, the procedural fairness ensured by the Act's promulga-
tion requirements is both necessary to the issuance of a valid standard 
and significant enough to render an expedient use of the general duty 
clause invalid.222 
OSHA's use of the general duty clause for CTDs similarly fails to 
uphold the policies of the Act - notice, consistency, and fairness. It 
provides neither preventive measures of sufficient detail to have any 
practical value nor procedures that ensure fair treatment of all em-
ployers and a workable solution for all employees. Its use for CTDs is 
unfair and ineffective and should be declared invalid. An ergonomics 
216. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643 (July 23, 1986). 
217. 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
218. 503 F.2d at 1160-61 (vacat~g procedurally flawed part of standard). 
219. Specifically, the Secretary had published the standard before receiving the recommenda-
tions and had held a hearing on the standard less than 30 days after receiving the recommenda-
tions. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,972 n.3 (July 23, 1986); 
29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(l)-(2) (1988). 
220. The OSHRC stated that 
[p]articularly in a situation like this, where a standard has been proposed and rulemaking 
proceedings have been conducted, the Secretary's failure to complete the rulemaking pro-
cess, coupled with his issuance of citations under the general duty clause, do not promote 
the goals of "fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application" that the 
Act's rulemaking provisions were designed to foster. 
1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,972 (July 23, 1986) (citation omitted). 
221. The general duty citations were vacated because the Secretary failed to prove that Kas-
talon's employees were exposed to a hazard. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,980. 
222. The similarity to OSHA's use of the general duty clause for CTDs is notable. Secretary 
Dole researched CTDs through NIOSH and stated her intent to promulgate an ergonomics stan-
dard. Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides, supra note 26, at A-7. However, no Secretary has ever 
promulgated an ergonomics standard, and no standard is likely to be issued in the near future. 
The failure to complete the rulemaking process, coupled with the extended use of the general 
duty clause, does not promote the goals of fairness contemplated by the Act and resembles an 
attempt to circumvent the Act's procedural requirements for promulgation. 
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standard, by contrast, would deal deliberately and fairly with the spe-
cial problems of CTDs apd thus better serve the Act's policies. Such a 
standard is the proper solution to the problem of CTDs. 
B. The Defensibility of the Proposed Solution 
The most plausible criticism of this proposal is that, if OSHA stops 
prosecuting employers for violations of the general duty clause, then, 
until the Secretary promulgates an ergonomics standard, workers will 
be totally unprotected from CTDs, in direct contravention of the Act's 
central purpose.223 In the interim, critics would argue, the protection 
provided by the general duty clause is at least better than no protec-
tion at all, and thus the clause should be used until any potential ergo-
nomics standard is promulgated. 224 
The criticism highlights the crucial issue of how best to protect 
workers, assuming that there is the requisite causal link between occu-
pational usages and CTDs. While the criticism's concern is genuine, it 
is inapposite to this Note's argument and can be easily dismissed. 
First, the preceding analysis of the general duty clause and the failure 
of CTDs to satisfy the clause's requirements renders OSHA's use of 
the clause for CTDs illegitimate. 225 The absence of an ergonomics 
standard does not change this fact. 226 
Second, the criticism is only result-oriented; its insight into the 
problem of CTDs is limited by its failure adequately to weigh the pol-
icy considerations underlying both the Act and the general duty 
clause. Providing workers with a safe and healthful workplace is not 
the exclusive purpose of the Act.227 Whether a particular course of 
action protects workers fairly and effectively may often determine 
whether OSHA should pursue that action.228 Because prosecution of 
employers for CTDs under the general duty clause consistently vio-
lates the Act's policies, such prosecution disrupts the Act's carefully 
balanced enforcement scheme. Use of the clause for CTDs is im-
proper and unwarranted even in the absence of an ergonomics 
223. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988) (to ensure safe and healthful working conditions). 
224. The argument gains even more support from the fact that Secretary Dole's cancellation 
of the plans to extend the new ergonomics guidelines for the red meat industry may indicate that 
her office is unconvinced that an ergonomics standard is needed. See supra notes 58·60 and 
accompanying text. This uncertainty probably further delays promulgation of an ergonomics 
standard. 
225. See supra Part II. 
226. Cf. BOKAT, supra note 58, at 109 (noting that the general duty clause was not intended 
to be a substitute for promulgated standards). 
227. See supra note 113. 
228. See, e.g., Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Assn. v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (holding a standard invalid insofar as its promulgation failed to uphold the policy of 
fair notice), cert denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Kastalon, Inc., 1986·1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 
27,643, at 35,972, 35,980 (July 23, 1986) (criticizing a use of the general duty clause that violated 
the policy of fairness and vacating citation on other grounds). 
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standard. 229 
Moreover, the criticism fails to appreciate that, without the use of 
the general duty clause, workers will be no less protected than they are 
now. For example, workers may recover for CTD injuries through 
workers' compensation insurance benefits with or without OSHA en-
forcement. 230 Workers receive no compensation from the general duty 
clause.231 Workers derive "protection" indirectly from the general 
duty clause in the form of programs that employers implement as a 
result of the clause's enforcement. To the extent that the prosecution 
of employers for alleged ergonomics violations of the ·general duty 
clause is ineffective, preventive programs will not be worth adopting 
for many employers. 
The proper way to protect workers from CTDs is through the pro-
mulgation of an ergonomics standard. Only through an ergonomics 
standard can OSHA protect workers while furthering the Act's poli-
cies. The Secretary is free to promulgate a standard for any hazard 
that poses a significant risk of harm to workers.232 There is enough 
evidence that CTDs pose a significant risk to satisfy this require-
ment. 233 For the protection of workers and the integrity of OSHA, the 
Secretary can and should promulgate a specific ergonomics standard. 
CONCLUSION 
CTDs are a serious problem worthy of the Secretary's efforts. The 
Secretary, however, has chosen to act through the general duty clause, 
an enforcement mechanism particularly inappropriate for use against 
229. Because of the primary role of specific standards and the statutory limitations on the 
applicability of the general duty clause, the policies of the Act dictate that some hazards that are 
not yet covered by a specific standard nevertheless do not fall within the coverage of the general 
duty clause. See supra text accompanying note 67. CTDs should be found to be such a hazard. 
230. The Act does not affect workers' compensation in any way. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) 
(1988); see also BOKAT, supra note 58, at 728 (finding that states have assented to the separation 
of OSHA from workers' compensation). Workers' compensation has been criticized as exacer-
bating the problem of workplace CTDs. See. e.g., Hadler, supra note 12, at 39-40 (finding that, if 
not restricted to discrete traumatic events, workers' compensation can be iatrogenic); Louis, 
supra note 12, at 825 ("A system of workers' compensation that was originally designed to pro-
tect workers is now working to penalize not only the workers, but all of us - workers, manage-
ment, and consumers."); Worrall & Appel, supra note 17, at 295-96 (concluding that workers' 
compensation gives workers an incentive both to claim more severe disabilities and to claim more 
often). Whether workers' compensation helps or aggravates the CTD problem, it will still be 
available to workers if OSHA stops using the general duty clause to prosecute employers for 
CTDs. Therefore, stopping that use of the clause would result in no less protection for workers 
on this ground. 
231. See Morey, supra note 39, at 992-93. The goal of the Act is preventive, not remedial. In 
re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990). 
232. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980). 
233. CTDs probably meet the "significant risk" requirement of the general duty clause. See 
supra text accompanying note 101. Because this requirement is derived from the same require-
ment in the promulgation process, see supra note 91, enough evidence of a significant risk of 
harm from workplace CTDs exists to allow OSHA to promulgate a standard. 
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CTDs. Because CTDs fail to satisfy the clause's requirements for ap-
plication, OSHA's use of the clause for CTDs is illegitimate. OSHA's 
continued use of the clause despite this illegitimacy also impinges on 
considerations of notice, consistency, and fairness. 
This does not mean that workers should go unprotected from 
CTDs. On the contrary, the argument that an ergonomics standard 
would better serve the policies of the Act, together with the finding 
that CTDs present a "significant risk" of harm, supports the conclu-
sion that the Secretary should promulgate an ergonomics standard. 234 
Most who have considered the problem urge this conclusion.23s 
The stringent timetable provided in the Act suggests that Congress 
intended tb,e Secretary to act quickly and decisively when she discov-
ers a workplace condition that presents a significant risk of harm.236 
Indecisive action - such as announcing and soon thereafter canceling 
a plan to promulgate an ergonomics standard and then prosecuting 
employers under the general duty clause237 - does not promote the 
goals of " 'fairness and mature consideration of rules of general appli-
cation' that the Act's rulemaking provisions were designed to fos-
ter. "238 The Secretary has had more than ample time to begin the 
promulgation process.239 The Act dictates, and its policies confirm, 
that the Secretary should promulgate an ergonomics standard as 
quickly as practicable. 
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l) (1988) (stating that the Secretary may promulgate a standard 
whenever doing so would serve the objectives of the Act); Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 642 
(stating that the Secretary may promulgate a standard when the hazard presents a significant risk 
of harm). Anything short of an ergonomics standard, such as ergonomics guidelines, would be 
ineffective in dealing with the problem. Guidelines would not carry the same weight as a stan· 
dard and, rather than drawing the clear lines of a standard, would leave room for wide misinter· 
pretation by OSHA field inspectors. Dan Malovany, Safety Issue Becomes a Pain in the Neck, 
Back and Wrist, BAKERY PROD. & MKTG., Oct. 24, 1990, at 25. 
235. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 6, at 169-70 (various participants concluding that 
the ball is "clearly in OSHA's court;" that OSHA is lagging behind congressional and public 
pressure; that an ergonomics standard is needed; and that OSHA could be much more aggressive 
in promulgating an ergonomics standard); Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25 (stating 
that an ergonomics standard should be promulgated to deal with the special medical concerns of 
CTDs). 
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(4) (1988); see also S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5182-5183 (stating that standards must be con· 
stantly improved and replaced with new standards as new knowledge and techniques are 
developed). 
237. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
238. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,972 (July 23, 1986) 
(quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969)). 
239. NIOSH requested information regarding work-related CTDs to determine the extent of 
the problem and to develop possible prevention strategies at least as early as 1989, with January 
22, 1990 as the deadline for data submissions. NIOSH Seeks Information on Occupational Cu-
mulative Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 
~ 10,292. 
